Is God There?
A Debate - Part 7



The following is a series of exchanges that took place on "The Fray" user discussion forum on Slate On-line magazine at http://www.slate.com. The numbers at the beginning of each "post" indicate the sequential order of the posts in this thread. I (Jeff Richardson) used the moniker "jeremiad" during this discussion.

2731. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
mnjperry.

"The debate is over whether these experiences yield valid knowledge."

Wait, I thought you couldn't determine the "validity" of belief - only whether the assumptions are consistent with the evidence? Then you use the term "knowledge" - justified, rational belief that is true. Yet you claim materialism makes no claims about truth. You are contradicting yourself again.

You then imply that religious experience is either hallucinatory or delusional. On what basis? Because alternative explanations have been presented? How do you judge the alternatives to be superior to the reality of religious experience except through another assumption of your own?

It seems you are merely displaying a bias and a prejudice. Neither you nor benandjerri have shown why extranaturalist belief is either unreasonable or unjustifiable.

Further, you have already admitted that much of scientific belief is not universal - is it therefore delusional as well? No. You have further admitted that religious experience has stood the test of more minds than much of this scientific knowledge - yet now you say religious experience is neither "universal nor consistent".

You continue your contradictions, mnjperry.

2732. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
benandjerri.

In you Message #2689, you state:

"Since our senses cannot detect anything BEFORE the big bang, it is pointless to concern ourselves with pre-big bang events."

You, therefore, admit that there are even physical things that exist that are indetectible to our senses. But what does this imply about nondetectible phenomena? It seems to imply that lack of detection (by our physical senses) is no statement for or against the existence of something.

Your position continues to weaken.

You state:

"If 2 sets of assumptions equally explain what my senses detect, but one is more complex than the other, or contains unnecessary assumptions, then why in the world should I choose it over the simpler set?"

On what basis do you judge simplicity to be more useful that complexity? Perhaps the most consistent, intuitive explanation requires additional assumptions - and if these assumptions are reconciled to the physical evidence, why is it less "useful" than another explanation requiring fewer assumptions? It seems that if an imagined explanation is consistent with our observations you have imposed yet _another_ criteria having to do with the numerical quantity of the propositions of the imagination. How is this logically justified? Why do you expect numerically simpler explanations to be superior to numerically more complex explanations if both meet your own original criteria for "usefulness"?

Your position is certainly becoming numerically complex with a new criteria around every corner...

Continued.

2733. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
Continued.

Both you and mnjperry seem to simply _prefer_ materialist explanations over _extranaturalist_ ones.

As I have said, if you define your epistemology carefully enough, this is easy. But it is also merely a religious belief that materialism is superior - with no demonstration as to why.

Also common in your posts is the continued cry that religious experience is illusory or delusional. On what basis is this claim made? It seems you do so simply because you don't want to accept these experiential data as evidence - since it would obviously invalidate your dogma.

Are you then saying that religious belief in a person is an indication of mental illness? Or perhaps religious people are "rationally bounded" so that they cannot see the irrationality of their beliefs? But, again, you seem to be making statements about truth and veracity - not evidentiary claims.

2734. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
The unswerving result of the discussion seems to be this:

For those who, by faith, adhere to materialistic dogma, all things presently have or (they firmly believe by faith) will at sometime in the future obtain, a physicalist explanation.

For those who, by faith, adhere to extranaturalist dogma, all things presently have an extranatural grounding and explanation.

In the posts by benandjerri & mnjperry, it is obvious that the only way to preclude extranatural belief is to carefully define what is acceptable evidence and to set up double standards as to evidentiary claims and to discount the beliefs of those who disagree with them as "delusional" or "hallucinatory".

The original problem for the materialist, however, still remains: How to reconcile our ability to obtain, review, and deliberate over evidence, and use reason and logic and self-causation to reach conclusions that are verifiable with our subsequent observations with the fact that materialism contraindicates the necessary conditions for rationality, reason, logic and self-causation to exist - and ultimately refutes itself as a theory of knowledge.

2738. mnjperry - January 2, 1997
Re:#2733 (Jeremiad):

"Also common in your posts is the continued cry that religious experience is illusory or delusional. On what basis is this claim made? It seems you do so simply because you don't want to accept these experiential data as evidence - since it would obviously invalidate your dogma."

But the "experiential data" for religious belief is identical to the "experiential data" for what everyone agrees (except the peoplewho are having them) are delusions and hallucinations. That is the basis of the claim. The fact that someone "feels" that God exists is no more reason to believe that he really does than the fact that someone "feels"Tinkerbell exists means that she really does.

2740. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
mnjperry.

You're still missing the point.

If my assumption _is_ that Tinkerbell exists - and I logically develop a set of criteria that I would expect to be met if she _did_ exist - and then that criteria is met with physical evidence, this clearly meets the standard of usefulness you are proclaiming. Denying this only makes you look dishonest.

The issue would be whether the logical development of expected criteria is (1) logically connected and sound, and (2) whether the criteria itself can be logically inferred from the specific belief. With respect to Tinkerbell, these criteria would not be met - but with respect to extranatural belief, they are.

Further, you are, by divine fiat apparently, equating religious experience with delusion and hallucination without any standard except to say they are both feelings. But you have already said this is all we have anyway - subjective feelings about things. So, on what basis do you differentiate the feeling of the existence of Tinkerbell with the feeling of belief in my own existence?

Again, you use the criteria I have already invoked. You are left with the conclusion that there is no basis other than prejudice to make the claim that extranatural belief is unjustified or irrational. Your responses are becoming silly with your own frustration!

2746. mnjperry - January 2, 1997
Re:#2734 (Jeremiad)

"The original problem for the materialist, however, still remains: How to reconcile our ability to obtain, review, and deliberate over evidence, and use reason and logic and self-causation to reach conclusions that are verifiable with our subsequent observations with the fact that materialism contraindicates the necessary conditions for rationality, reason, logic and self-causation to exist - and ultimates refutes itself as a theory of knowledge."

I'll try one more time: For materialism to be a valid explanation of our observation and experience--our minds--the only thing we have to reconcile it with is our observation and experience. We don't have to reconcile it with reason, logic, free will, etc., in any sense beyond our *experience* of those phenomena. In particular, we don't have to reconcile materialism with an understanding of reason that rests on the *assumption* that it has a supernatural reality independent of our *experience* of it.

2750. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
mnjperry.

Again, I have defined rationality and its necessary premises publicly and clearly for all to review. No one has shown how even one of the premises "presumes" a supernatural reality - least of all you with your constant evasion.

You appear content to levy the charge with no proof and in spite of my clearly stated premises to the contrary.

Further, you have yet to offer an alternative development of rationality without the premises I stated. Please give these criteria and show how materialism meets them. (This is about the 300th time I've asked for this - and given past experience, you still won't be able to present an answer - except to say you don't like my conclusions.)

Re: Message #2744. This is the point _I_ make in Message #2740 about the belief being substantiated with evidence. Belief in Tinkerbell, as I have said, fails. Belief in extranatural phenomena does not.

2751. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
mnjperry.

Your prejudice continues to show through.

The criteria for usefulness is applicable as long as the conclusions drawn are only materialistic. If the conclusions drawn are non-materialistic, then additional criteria must be applied and the previous conclusion discarded!

Now, apparently meeting the criteria isn't sufficient - one must meet the criteria _and_ not be able to present an alternative explanation adhering to materialist dogma! This is comic!

Further, I have never said that materialistic doctrine would not yield many valid results when applied to physical systems - as you imply in Message #2746. I have simply shown that as a comprehensive epistemology, it is self-refuting.

You cannot escape the need for explaining rationality by saying you can deduce conclusions without it! You are using and assuming rationality exists in order to reach this conclusion! And, it is still true, your doctrine cannot reconcile rationality with its own presuppositions.

2752. mnjperry - January 2, 1997
Re:#2750 (Jeremiad):

"This is the point _I_ make in Message #2740 about the belief being substantiated with evidence. Belief in Tinkerbell, as I have said, fails. Belief in extranatural phenomena does not."

Well, make up your mind. Do you believe in God based on some non-sensory "experience" of his existence or not? You have claimed in earlier posts that this kind of revealed knowledge is the foundation of your belief. If this is the case, your belief carries no more weight than that of someone who believes in Tinkerbell based on a "feeling" that she exists.

If you are now claiming that this "experience" of God is by itself insufficient to persuade you that he exists, and that there is some "evidence" that compels belief in a supernatural reality beyond the material world, what is this evidence?

2755. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
mnjperry.

As I have already shown - using your own contrived criteria of "usefulness" - if I assume (imagine/feel/whatever your latest term happens to be) that there is extranatural phenomena such as an Intelligent Designer, I would then derive logically sound criteria that are verifiable to corroborate this belief. If the criteria are met - and logically follow from the belief, by your own criteria, such belief is justified.

Tinkerbell doensn't cut it, but extranaturalism does.

Finally,I am not basing my belief in the TRUTH of extranaturalism on this "usefulness" criteria. I am simply demonstrating how the criteria _you_ have concocted does nothing to refute extranatural belief.

I have further shown that all "useful" belief, as you define it, is subjective experience we corroborate with physical observation and consistent human witness. And as such religious experience is just as valid from an evidentiary perspective as belief in other minds or my own existence.

2763. mnjperry - January 2, 1997
Re:#2755 (Jeremiad)

"I have further shown that all "useful" belief, as you define it, is subjective experience we corroborate with physical observation and consistent human witness. And as such religious experience isjust as valid from an evidentiary perspective as belief in other minds or my own existence."

But this is obviously not true. Religious claims about the world have been proven false from an "evidentiary perspective" time and time again. Religious experience led people to believe that the sun revolves around the Earth. This is wrong. Answers based on religious experience to such diverse questions as when to plant crops, whether a volcano is about to erupt, and how the human species came into existence have all been proven flawed or utterly false from an "evidentiary perspective" by science. Religious claims about the natural world are hopelessly unreliable. That's why most major religions have stopped making them.

2764. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
If we discard the obviously lacking "usefulness" criteria of mnjperry & benandjerri and discuss how we really achieve understanding, it is obvious that if we _begin_ with naturalism/materialism and presume this to be superior, we will find it difficult to see extranaturalistic evidence. If we, on the other hand, choose extranaturalism as a _beginning_, we are capable of seeing materialistic and extranaturalistic evidence.

This, again, goes to the point of showing that either belief system is a _beginning_ point - not one _arrived at_ based on evidence. However, subsequent observations and reason and logic may lead to conflicts with our belief system that should, if we are honest, require us to re-evaluate our worldview.

It has been obvious for some time now that the materialists here not only refuse to admit the serious flaws in their worldview, but consider themselves above the puny constraints of logic and reason and deny any requirement to answer their shortcomings.

They have chosen, instead, to attempt to superimpose their belief system on the evidence - thus, neatly screening out any beliefs that run contrary to their dogma. While they may manage to remain convinced themselves, their dishonesty is glaring.

2765. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
Message #2763, mnjperry.

So, your position is that materialistic claims, by percentage, have basically always been correct - never disproved, modified, discarded, superceded, etc.?

To discard an entire perceptual mechanism because it has made mistakes is a serious flaw in judgment. Certainly religious claims have been disproved - and I'm sure will continue to be - but no more or less so than in the history of science.

Again, you seek to convince yourself of something that is obviously not true.

2771. jeremiad - January 2, 1997 You say that my basis for belief in rationality is "assumption, conjecture and speculation."

I agree that this is the starting point.

But aren't you the one that claims all belief _begins_ with these imaginative constructs and is then tested against evidence, consistent human witness, logic and reason?

Are you saying that your beliefs may be derived in this way but others' may not?

You appear to be using a double standard that is not only unjustified, but dishonest, as well.

If my assumptions about rationality are proved by evidence (can I reason? do I seem to have free will? does there appear to be a set of laws that apply consistently to propositions and mathematical statements?) and are attested to consistently by human witness (do most humans now and have most in history believe in logic, reason, and rationality?), I have met the criteria for a "useful" belief.

Further, it is your belief system that seems to lack evidentiary substantiation and consistent human witness. In addition to this, as I have shown, it is even logically incoherent (both internally and externally) and refutes its own validity.

Finally, you don't understand the point about presuppositions. Extranaturalism & materialism areassumptions we make initially - neither is more or less "necessary" than the other. It is the subsequent analysis that determines their veracity. Materialism is no more sound of an initial assumption than extranaturalism. We choose them initially because we want to. We adhere to them when they fail to be substantied because we are dishonest.

2773. jeremiad - January 2, 1997
I agree that materialism and extranaturalism start out with the same foundations - assumptions and speculation. What Ihave shown, however, is that subsequent evidence and analysis shows materialism to be logically flawed.

This is the point you dont' seem to understand.

Materialism is every bit as much conjecture and speculation as any other worldview. You have no "special knowledge" that proves it to be superior.

As such, it must stand and pass the same tests as all other belief systems in order to be credible. It simply has the unfortunate fate of failing the tests.


The Conclusion of the Matter

Ultimately, no one - with the noted exception of IamNewman - even approached the issue of materialism's self-refutation. With the one response found so lacking, perhaps others simply gave up any hope and chose the path of further obfuscation and evasion.

Oddly enough, IamNewman later stated in the Fray that, "[t]he problem with Materialism by itself is that it assumes there is no immaterial rationality, yet then recognizes the rationality of nature. However for nature to be rational, there must be something which imposes that rationality." Which is what I'd demonstrated clearly for over a thousand posts! So, perhaps, my time was not completely wasted on the discussion - apparently a few less fanatical atheists let some of the logic I used creep into their heads.

Little can be said about the discussion except that it demonstrates the ferocity of religious zeal held by the atheists in the discussion. It also demonstrates their incessent need to invoke stereotypes of theists in order to convince themselves of their own "mental superiority".

I found the discussion, at times, interesting and lively. But found most of the participants to be less interested in discussion and learning than proselytizing and insulting to reinforce their own beliefs.

Ultimately, as Calvin showed, the sensus divinitatus present in all of us must be overcome to disbelieve in God. And that God himself must provide within us the ability to believe.



Part 6 | Table of Contents